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Summary 
The European Commission has acknowledged the lack of cross-border 
utilization of losses. Companies operating internationally want to have a 
possibility to offset losses against taxable profits at the same time or as soon 
as possible after the losses incurred. If no such possibility is at hand, a cash-
flow disadvantage arises and also, it leads to segmentation of the internal 
market. The asymmetries occur while Member States enjoy sovereignty and 
a broad competence to levy taxes and determine the geographical extent of 
their tax jurisdiction. Member States are competent to apply a territorial 
taxation system and thereby limit the utilization of companies’ losses in 
cross-border situations. However, the meaning of territorial taxation differs 
depending on if it is seen from an international law or international tax law 
perspective. The European Court of Justice recognises a territorial taxation 
system from an international law perspective. This includes a right for the 
Member States to tax residents on their worldwide income and non-
residents on their territorial income.  
Member States limit cross-border utilization of losses in order to preserve 
their tax bases. A territorial tax system can be achieved in two different 
ways. The first is by a definition of the tax base for income tax purposes, i.e. 
by limiting the tax base to locally sourced income and capital. The second is 
by exempting foreign-sourced income through unilateral, bilateral or 
multilateral conventions. The issue arises when Member States apply a 
double taxation convention with the exemption method. In that case, there is 
no possibility to utilize the losses in either the host State or the home State. 
However, the European Court of Justice may in certain situations require 
Member States to make it possible to utilize cross-border losses, whereas in 
other situations the European Court of Justice has recognised Member 
States sovereignty by stating that Member States do not need to utilize 
cross-border losses. In the latter situation, the European Court of Justice 
recognises Member States sovereignty and it may express an underlying 
principle, in terms of territoriality.  
The examination implies that the territoriality principle is more a 
consequence of Member States sovereignty than a self-supporting principle. 
Furthermore, the concept of territoriality falls into the background of other 
conceded concepts, such as the balanced allocation of taxing powers and 
symmetry. Yet, the concept of territoriality is still evolving within the 
European Union and will certainly be affected by the growing work on 
international level. When evolving the concept of territoriality, the European 
Union has to find a balance between the concept of an internal market and 
the Member States’ sovereignty. At the moment, the European Court of 
Justice recognises the Member States’ sovereignty even if it contradicts the 
concept of an internal market. Thus, cross-border losses attributable to 
permanent establishments are stranded when the Member States apply the 
exemption method in their double taxation conventions. In order for the 
territoriality principle to be a self-supporting principle it needs to get a clear 
definition and a consistent applicability.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In the light of the Member States’ sovereignty, there is a right to levy taxes 
and also to decide the geographical extent of their tax jurisdiction. While 
each Member State determines the criteria and thereby the scope of its 
taxation, Member States are free to apply the territoriality principle in 
situations of income taxation.1 The territoriality principle includes a right for 
the Member State to tax both residents and non-residents on the income 
from sources in that State as well as property situated in that State.2 Yet, the 
concept of territoriality appears to differ whether it is seen from the 
perspective of international law or international tax law.3 Since Member 
States enjoy liberty to determine the geographical scope of their tax 
jurisdiction regarding companies’ business income, asymmetries occur.4  
Member States may in principle disregard foreign-sourced income through 
double tax conventions (DTCs). Moreover, by using the exemption method, 
losses arising cross-border in a permanent establishment (PE) cannot be 
taken into account in either the host State or in the home State.5 Hence, the 
issue of non-possibility to utilize the cross-border losses attributable to the 
PE arises.6 This implies a difference in treatment as losses attributable to a 
domestic PE is offset against the profits in the Head Office (HO).7 
In a European Union (EU) context, this constitutes an obstacle to the 
freedom of establishment since a company with a PE cross-border is in a 
comparable situation to a company with a domestic one.8 The European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) may, regardless of the DTC, require Member States 
to make it possible to utilize cross-border losses in certain constellations.9 
Yet, the ECJ has in certain situations been recognising Member State 
sovereignty by stating that Member States do not need to utilize cross-
border losses.10 In the latter situations, the ECJ recognises Member States 
sovereignty and it may be an underlying principle, in terms of territoriality. 
In this sense, the ECJ disregards equal treatment of a domestic PE and a 
cross-border PE regarding losses, since a company with a PE cross-border is 
not treated the same as a company with a domestic PE. Further, the ECJ has 
                                                
1 Helminen, Marjaana, EU Tax Law –Direct Taxation, IBFD, 1 Juni 2013, chapter (ch.) 1 p. 
2.  
2 Definition of the Territoriality principle, IBFD International Tax Glossary, 2015.  
3 Marres, Otto, The Principle of Territoriality and Cross-border Loss Compensation, 
INTERTAX, Volume 39, Issue 3, Kluwer Law International, 2011, p. 112. 
4 Marres (n 3), p. 112. 
5 COM (2006) 824 final, Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, p. 5; Marres 
(n 3), p. 112. 
6 COM (2006) 824 final, Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, p. 5. 
7 Ch. 40, section (sec.) 2 Swedish Income Tax Act (SITA); COM (2006) 824 final, Tax 
Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, p. 4-5. 
8 Case C-141/99 AMID, paragraphs (paras). 25 ff.  
9 Case C-293/06 Deutsche Shell, para. 53; Lüdicke, Jürgen, Altorfer, B, Jürg, Blanluet, 
Gauthier, Hohenwarter-Mayr, Daniela, Inoue, Koichi, Suarez, Steve and Lange-Hückstädt, 
Carolin, International Cross-Border Loss Utilization, Bulletin for International Taxation, 
June/July 2014, Volume 68, No. 6/7, IBFD, published online 27 May 2014, p. 376. 
10 C-250/95 Futura Participations SA, para. 43; Case C-414/06 Lidl Belgium, para. 54; 
Case C-157/07 Krankenheim, para. 55; C-686/13 X AB v. Skatteverket para. 41. 
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referred to the principle of territoriality as a criterion that may affect the 
determination of whether a measure by the Member State is restrictive.11 
Thus, it can be questioned whether the territoriality principle may serve as a 
justification ground for treating companies in a comparable situation 
differently regarding cross-border losses attributable to PEs.  
The lack of cross-border offsetting leads to cash-flow disadvantages,12 and 
segmentation of the internal market.13 In order for companies to avoid these 
disadvantages, companies operating internationally will want to offset losses 
against taxable profits at the same time or as soon as possible after the 
losses incurred.14 The disadvantages have been acknowledged by the 
European Commission and hence, various approaches and initiatives have 
been taken in order to tackle the problem. Even if the Commissions general 
tax policy and specific suggestions may influence the Member States, the 
initiatives have not been successful.15 
Based on the aforementioned, the thesis will examine the issue concerning 
Member States’ DTCs, which limit cross-border loss utilization where 
international activities of a company result in losses in the host State, and 
profits in the home State. It is of interest to examine to what extent a 
territorial approach is acceptable under EU law and its fundamental 
freedoms since it results in a non-utilization of cross-border losses for 
companies, which contradicts the concept of an internal market. In addition, 
the thesis will examine the differences that exist between the concept of 
territoriality in international law and international tax law, and also which 
concept the ECJ’s adapts.  
1.2 Aim 
The aim of the thesis is to examine whether the territoriality principle can be 
discerned from the ECJ’s case law regarding the tax treatment of loss 
utilization attributable to PEs in cross-border situations.  
                                                
11 C-250/95 Futura Participations SA, paras. 20-22.  
12 Lüdicke and others, (n 9), p. 376. 
13 COM (90) 595 final, the proposal for a Council Directive concerning arrangements for 
the taking into account by enterprises of the losses of their permanent establishments and 
subsidiaries situated in other Member States, p. 2; COM (84) 404 final, proposal for a 
directive of the Council on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to 
tax arrangements for the carry-over of losses of undertakings; COM (2006) 824 final 
European Commission, Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations; European 
Parliament, Resolution on Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, 2007/2144 
(INI). 
14 Lüdicke and others, (n 9), p. 376. 
15 COM (90) 595 final, the proposal for a Council Directive concerning arrangements for 
the taking into account by enterprises of the losses of their permanent establishments and 
subsidiaries situated in other Member States, p. 2; COM (84) 404 final, proposal for a 
directive of the Council on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to 
tax arrangements for the carry-over of losses of undertakings; COM (2006) 824 final 
European Commission, Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations; European 
Parliament, Resolution on Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, 2007/2144 
(INI). 
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Subsequently, if a principle of territoriality can be discerned from EU law, 
does the ECJ’s understanding reconcile with the concept of territoriality in 
international law or international tax law?  
1.3 Definition and scope of a company’s own cross-border losses  
Cross-border loss utilization is limited to foreign corporate losses, where 
foreign losses include negative income from other tax jurisdictions.16 The 
term losses are defined as the excess of expenses over revenues for a 
period.17 The examination will cover companies’ reduction of their tax 
burden, which lower their income tax base through offsetting losses against 
taxable income. Consequently, cross-border loss utilization implies a 
possibility for the HO to lower their income tax base though offsetting 
losses arising in the PE against their taxable income.  
Furthermore, the examination of losses will extend to also cover currency 
losses; however, where the situation regards currency losses, it will be 
explicitly stated.18 Moreover, the losses discussed through this thesis are 
companies’ own losses limited to negative income attributable to a foreign 
PE.19 In addition, negative income attributable to a foreign subsidiary will 
also be examined to some extent, even if PEs and subsidiaries are not 
generally in a comparable situation due to their different legal form and their 
recognition as residents for subsidiaries and as non-residents for PEs.20 A 
parent company with a foreign subsidiary may be in a comparable situation 
to a company having a foreign PE where the States apply the exemption 
method in their DTC, which means that foreign losses cannot be utilized in 
any situation.  
Generally, losses incurred by foreign PEs are offset against the HO profits 
and the existing tax exposure diminishes in the company’s home State.21 
This is possible in Sweden without time limit. However, this is true only if 
the States do not apply a DTC with the exemption method.22 Some States 
require that this deduction is recaptured and no relief for juridical double 
taxation of the PE’s profits are available as long as the previously deducted 
losses are not recaptured.23 A recapture rule permits the deduction of foreign 
losses at the HO level; however, as soon as the PE becomes profitable, the 
losses are recaptured.24 
Further, some home States apply a time limit within which the temporarily 
imported foreign losses must be offset by subsequent PE profits and thus, 
the loss deduction in the home State must be recaptured. If this time limit 
                                                
16 Lüdicke and others, (n 9), p. 376. 
17 Definition of Loss, IBFD, International Tax Glossary, 2015. 
18 Lüdicke and others, (n 9), p. 376. 
19 Lüdicke and others, (n 9), p. 377. 
20 Wattel, J, Peter, Corporate tax jurisdiction in the EU with respect to branches and 
subsidiaries; dislocation distinguished from discrimination and disparity; a plea fore 
territoriality, EC Tax Review 2003/4, p. 197-198.  
21 Lang, Michael, Has the Case Law of the ECJ on Final Losses Reached the End of the 
Line?, European Taxation, December 2014, IBFD, p. 539; Dahlberg, Mattias, Internationell 
beskattning, upplaga 3:1, Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2012, p. 68.  
22 Ch. 40, sec. 2, SITA; Commentary on law ch. 14, sec. 10, SITA.  
23 Wattel, (n 20), p. 196. 
24 Lang, (n 21), p. 539. 
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for example (e.g.) is five years, and if the PE losses are still uncompensated 
after five years, the losses will be reinstated in the taxable profit of the 
company. Additionally, if no time limit exists in the home State and the PE 
is wound up after the loss making, the losses will have to be imported 
permanently in the home State. Hence, this cross-border loss utilization is 
not possible where the States have a DTC applying the exemption method. 
Therefore, there is in that situation no possibility for the PE to utilize its 
losses in the home State. This situation implies similarities with losses 
incurred in a foreign subsidiary. While these losses cannot be offset against 
the parent company’s profits and thereby, not imported in the home State. 
Losses in foreign subsidiaries may not be imported even temporarily. 
Hence, the losses have to be rolled over to fiscal years in which the foreign 
subsidiary itself make profits and has a possibility to offset against.25 In line 
with this fact, arguments concerning cross-border loss utilization for PEs 
will be supported with findings discerned from case law on cross-border 
loss utilization for subsidiaries. 
1.4 Method and material 
For the purposes of this thesis, the legal dogmatic research method is used. 
This means that the research is conducted of current law as laid down in 
written and unwritten European, international or national rules, principles, 
concepts, doctrines, case law and in literature.26 The issue regarding non-
utilization of cross-border losses arises due to disparities in legal pluralism. 
Therefore, all the different legal orders have to be examined. The method is 
conducted in a two-part process where the sources of law in the different 
legal orders are identified, and then interpreted, analysed, systemized and 
confronted with each other.27  
For the purposes of explaining taxation of PEs, the Member States domestic 
situations are the starting point where there is an example from Swedish 
law. However, the emphasis is placed on how Member States treat PE losses 
in cross-border situations. Therefore, Member States’ DTCs, which are 
based on The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Model Tax Convention and its commentaries, are at the centre 
since these stipulate Member States taxing powers. Further, the taxation of 
PEs is clarified with primary and secondary sources of EU law in terms of 
the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU), ECJ case law and the Commission’s proposals 
for directives, and also doctrinal publications and academic debates.  
The research regarding the definition, meaning and concept of the 
territoriality principle is based on soft law, whereas the principle is 
unwritten law. The materials used include journals, books, IBFD and reports 
from the Base Erosion and Profit-shifting (BEPS) project.   
When analysing whether the ECJ discerns the territoriality principle when 
denying cross-border loss utilization attributable to PEs, the ECJ’s own case 
law are in focus. AG Opinions and the Commission’s proposals for 
                                                
25 Wattel, (n 20), p. 196. 
26 Douma, Sjoerd, Legal Research in International and EU Tax Law, Kluwer, 2014, p. 18. 
27 Douma, (n 26), p. 20. 
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directives complement this material. When discussing the difference 
between losses, German national cases will be reviewed to find guidance 
how to assess where a final loss exists and also, what a final loss is.  
As this topic is of much debate and discussion, numerous papers and 
journals have been written regarding cross-border loss utilization within the 
EU. In that sense, the whole thesis is, on a large scale, based on doctrine in 
this area. This is done in order to highlight different aspects of the topic, to 
strengthen the reasoning and also, to achieve the aim of this thesis.  
1.5 Delimitation 
This paper will focus solely on the corporate aspects in taxation within the 
EU. While corporate taxation consists of two components, direct and 
indirect taxation, this thesis delimitates from examining the indirect taxation 
due to the significant progress towards harmonization in that area.28  
Neither individual deductions nor expense allocation issues (e.g. transfer 
pricing questions) will be examined, since the examination will be limited to 
cover situations regarding the reduction of the tax burden of companies that 
lower their tax base through offsetting losses against taxable income and 
currency losses.29  
The case law examination will not cover cross-border loss utilization 
regarding individuals and therefore the ability to pay principle will not be 
covered. This is because the principle is of relevance solely for individuals 
and seems to be an irrelevant criterion in the context of taxation of 
companies.30  
Further, the thesis delimitates from addressing rules regarding “losses of 
other entities”, in example (i.e.) situations covering a taxpayer resident in 
one State that is allowed to use the losses of another legally independent 
taxpayer resident for tax purposes in another state.31 “Losses of other 
entities” in terms of subsidiaries is solely touched upon when reviewing 
ECJ’s case law in order to understand, and draw guidance therefrom, 
regarding the territoriality principle.32 The delimitation depends on the 
different tax treatment of own losses and losses of other entities under 
domestic law and also, that this distinction regularly has an impact on the 
calculation of foreign tax credits in DTC situations. Own losses are reflected 
in the taxpayer’s own tax balance sheet or profit and loss accounts in the 
home State provided that this State taxes income on a worldwide basis.33  
Since this thesis largely delimitates from “losses from other entities”, cross-
border group taxation and hybrid instruments are not touched upon. In 
addition the thesis will not cover the Commission’s efforts to establish a 
European Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), while it to 
                                                
28 Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax.  
29 Lüdicke and others, (n 9), p. 376. 
30 Marres, (n 3), p. 125. 
31 Lüdicke and others, (n 9), p. 377. 
32 Lüdicke and others, (n 9), p. 377. 
33 Lüdicke and others, (n 9), p. 377. 
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a large extent would solve problems for groups of companies, which is not 
covered by this thesis.34  
The research for this thesis was completed on 10 November 2015. 
Therefore, this thesis does not take into account material published after that 
date.  
1.5 Outline 
Following the introduction, the taxation rules regarding PEs are presented 
(2), the purpose of which is to inform the reader about the legal pluralism 
and how Member States tax PEs. The starting point is Member States 
domestic rules, which is followed by the impact of EU requirements and 
Member States DTCs based on international law. The thesis proceeds with 
an examination of the different concepts of the territoriality principle (3). In 
order to achieve this thesis’ aim of determining whether there is an 
underlying territoriality principle within EU, this thesis proceeds with an 
analysis of ECJ’s case law regarding cross-border loss utilization of losses 
attributable to PEs and subsidiaries (4). Following the analysis, concluding 
remarks are presented, wherein the author tries to disentangle how the 
territoriality principle is expressed, if it is recognised and thereby, affects 
the outcome of ECJ’s case law (5). This thesis concludes with a conclusion 
based on the thesis entire examination (6).  
2. Taxation of PEs 
2.1 Introduction 
Due to the legal pluralism between international law, EU law and the 
Member States’ domestic law, this chapter will review how the different 
legal orders affect the attribution of profits to PEs and thus, how the PEs are 
taxed due to the different legal orders.  
2.1.1 Tax treatment of losses in domestic situations 
The tax treatment of losses in a domestic situation within a single company 
is automatically and immediately granted relief, and the company will be 
taxed on the net result of all domestic branch activities through PEs. 
Subsequently, the relief will be automatically recaptured when the loss-
making part of the company receives profits since the taxation takes place in 
the same State.35 An example is Sweden’s domestic law, which provides 
that legal entities are considered to have unlimited tax liability if they are 
registered or, if no registration is at hand, if they have their real seat in 
Sweden. Unlimited tax liability implies that the company is taxable on all 
income in Sweden and abroad.36 All economic activities carried on by a 
Swedish legal person are regarded as a single business.37 This implies, 
according to Sweden’s domestic law, that profits and losses attributable to 
the PE shall be allocated to the HO. Consequently, income is taxed, and 
losses are offset in the HO. If there is a loss in the total calculation of the 
corporate income, it is a possibility for the HO to use the loss during the 
                                                
34 Lüdicke and others, (n 9), p. 383. 
35 COM (2006) 824 final, Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, p. 4-5. 
36 Ch. 6, sec. 3-4, SITA.  
37 Ch.14, sec. 10, SITA. 
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next fiscal year. In addition, if the company makes a loss also the next year, 
the previous year’s loss is increased by the amount of the current year loss. 
Tax losses may therefore be carried forward indefinitely, without a time 
limit.38 However, restrictions in terms of an amount limitation rule and an 
offset restriction rule may apply if there is a change in ownership.39 
2.1.2 Tax treatment of losses in cross-border situations 
The EU has repeatedly attempted to co-ordinate the issue arising from 
companies’ inability to deduct the losses incurred by PEs situated in a 
Member State other than where the company in question is resident for tax 
purposes.40 This serves as an obstacle that might seriously hamper activities 
within a common market.41 The EU’s endless attempts to harmonize in 
order for cross-border losses not to be treated less favourably than domestic 
losses is still not close to being adopted, and is not expected to be, in the 
near future. Although this does not mean that a prohibition forbidding the 
offsetting of losses would be consistent with the fundamental freedoms 
preserved by the EU.42  
In absence of a possibility for cross-border utilization, the offset of losses 
would generally be limited to the amount of profits generated in the 
Member State in which the company is established and its place of 
investment. This limitation distorts business decisions.43  
In international tax law, there are different principles of taxation, both 
resident taxation and source taxation. The ECJ has in its case law accepted 
both principles. However, since a PE is not a legal person in its own right, 
the principle of source taxation shall apply. Thus, a PE is taxed in the State 
where its economic activity takes place, and it is only liable to tax in the 
State where the PE is conducting its business.44 
Although the PE lacks legal personality and is considered a non-resident 
from a tax perspective,45 the PE obtains the right from EU law, if it is in a 
comparable situation, to be treated in the same way as resident companies 
                                                
38 Ch. 40, sec 2, SITA.  
39 Ch. 40, sec. 10-14, SITA. 
40 COM (90) 595 final, the proposal for a Council Directive concerning arrangements for 
the taking into account by enterprises of the losses of their permanent establishments and 
subsidiaries situated in other Member States, p. 2; COM (84) 404 final, proposal for a 
directive of the Council on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to 
tax arrangements for the carry-over of losses of undertakings; COM (2006) 824 final, Tax 
Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations and Official journal of the European 
Union; European Parliament, Resolution on Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border 
Situations, (2007/2144 (INI)). 
41 COM (2001) 582 final, Towards an Internal Market without tax obstacles –A strategy for 
providing companies with a consolidated corporate tax base for their EU-wide activities, p. 
12. 
42 Gassner, Wolfgang, Lang, Michael and Lechner, Eduard, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 
Series on International Taxation, Kluwer Law International, 1997, Linde Verlag Wien, p. 
81-82.  
43 COM (2006) 824 final, Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, p. 2. 
44 Ben J.M Terra and Peter J Wattel, European Tax Law, 5th edition, Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2008, p. 170. 
45 COM (2006) 824 final, Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, p. 5. 
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regarding the method of determining the taxable base.46 This applies if, all 
other circumstances being equal. Hereby, the PE’s result forms a part of the 
overall result for the Member State where the HO is located. However, the 
DTCs between Member States stipulate the allocation right for a Member 
State to tax an income. 
Generally, the DTC gives the primary right of taxation to the host State, 
while the home State is given the secondary taxing rights concerning the 
income of the PE.47 This implies, most commonly, that the income of the PE 
is exempt or the tax is credited in the State of residence and thereby, taxed 
in the State of establishment.48 Member States make use of the exemption 
method and credit method provided for by the OECD Model Convention in 
order to eliminate juridical double taxation.49 Juridical double taxation is 
when a taxpayer is subject to tax on the same income or capital in more than 
one jurisdiction.50 It is for the Member States to choose the technique of 
elimination of double taxation in their DTCs.51 According to the foregoing; 
the taxation may therefore be different in situations where a DTC is 
established between the countries in question. However, the DTC has to be 
compatible with EU law.52  
Further, when the taxable amount for each State has to be determined, the 
income attributable to each area of the businesses has to be recognised. This 
attribution is usually based upon the OECD Model Tax Convention, where 
profits are allocated to a PE by different criteria.53 The allocation of income 
criteria and the methods for eliminating double taxation will be further 
discussed in the following. 
2.2 OECD Model Tax Convention 
It is stated in the OECD Model Tax Convention that profits of an enterprise 
of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State except in situations 
where the enterprise carries on business through a PE situated in another 
Contracting State. If so, the profits attributable to the PE may be taxed in 
that other State. The profits are allocated to the PE due to the functions 
performed, assets used and risks assumed. Thus, the profits attributable to 
the PE are the profits the PE is expected to make. Furthermore, when a 
Contracting State adjusts the profits attributable to the PE of an enterprise of 
                                                
46 Case C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland, paras. 28-29 and 34.  
47 OECD (2014) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 
2014, OECD Publishing, 15 July 2014, Article 7 (p. 28-29); COM (2006) 824 final, Tax 
Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, p. 5. 
48 OECD (2014) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 
2014, OECD Publishing, 15 July 2014, Articles 23 A and B.  
49 OECD (2014) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 
2014, OECD Publishing, 15 July 2014, Article 23; COM (2006) 824 final, Tax Treatment 
of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, p. 5. 
50 Lang, Michael, Introduction to the Law of Double Taxation Convention, 2nd edition, 
IBFD, 1 January 2013, ch.1, p. 3. 
51 COM (2006) 824 final, Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, p. 5. 
52 Case C-307/97 Saint-Gobain ZN, para. 55.  
53 OECD (2014) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 
2014, OECD Publishing, 15 July 2014, Article 7 (p. 28-29); COM (2006) 824 final, Tax 
Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, p. 5. 
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one of the Contracting States and thereby taxes the profits of an enterprise 
that have been subject to tax in the other State, the other State shall make an 
appropriate adjustment to the amount of tax charged on those profits. This 
adjustment shall be done in order to eliminate double taxation. In this case, 
if necessary, the competent authorities of the Contracting States shall 
consult with each other.54  
Article 7 of the OECD model tax treaty expresses both the State of 
residence principle and the source State principle; the source State principle 
is applied when there is a PE at issue. If the economic activity meets the 
requirements listed in article 5 a sufficient tie exists between the activity and 
the source State and consequently, a PE exists. In that sense, the source 
State is entitled to tax the income allocated to the PE, and in situations 
where no PE exists, the State of residence enjoys exclusive rights to tax the 
income irrespective of in which State it is earned. This does not provide a 
complete solution to the problem of the juridical double taxation of business 
profits. However there is no requirement to eliminate juridical double 
taxation. In addition to the definition of a PE, it is necessary to have an 
agreed set of rules stating how the profits attributable to the PE are supposed 
to be calculated.55 Consequently, rules on how the taxing rights will be 
allocated between the States. 
Despite several amendments, the criteria for attribution of profits to a PE 
still remain. The principles on which article 7 paragraph 2 are based on are 
the separate entity and arm’s length principles. The OECD has been trying 
to make modifications in order to clarify the purpose of the principles, since 
there have been variation in the interpretation of these principles. The 
clarification of today’s wording is based on a report from 2008, Attribution 
of Profits to Permanent Establishments.56 As a general rule, if an enterprise 
does not have a PE in another State, it should not be regarded as 
participating in the economic life of the other state, and thus the other State 
shall not have taxing rights. Furthermore, the right to tax for the State where 
the PE is located does not extend to the profits that the enterprise may 
derive from that State but cannot be attributable to the PE.57 Thus, profits 
attributable to the PE can be both from the host State or other States. Thus, 
the PE may be taxed on its worldwide income under international tax law. 
However, what the PE is really taxed on depends on if the host State applies 
a territorial system or worldwide system in its domestic law.58 Hence, the 
juridical double taxation needs to be avoided through the States’ DTCs.  
                                                
54 OECD (2014) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 
2014, OECD Publishing, 15 July 2014, Article 7 (p. 28-29). 
55 OECD (2014) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 
2014, OECD Publishing, 15 July 2014, Commentary on Article 7 –Concerning the taxation 
of business profits, I Preliminary remarks (p. 132).  
56 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, 22 July 2010, 
OECD. 
57 OECD (2014) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 
2014, OECD Publishing, 15 July 2014, Commentary on Article 7 –II Commentary on the 
provisions of the Article (p. 134-135). 
58 Yong, Singyan, Triangular Treaty Cases: Putting Permanent Establishments in Their 
Proper Place, Bulletin for International Taxation, March 2010, Volume 64, No. 3, 
Published online on 3 February 2010, IBFD, p. 155. 
10 
 
The methods for alleviation of juridical double taxation in the OECD-model 
are the credit method59 and the exemption method60, and will be further 
discussed in the following. 
2.2.1 The Credit method 
Using the credit method, the State of residence takes the worldwide income 
into account and thus, the tax levied in the source State is credited against 
the taxpayer’s tax levied in the State of residence. In that sense, the credit 
method works in a similar way as the treatment of losses in domestic 
situations; any loss will thereby be taken into account when determining the 
worldwide income.61 This method reflects capital export neutrality (CEN). 
When the tax rate is higher in the resident State than in the source State, the 
total tax burden will be the rate applied in the resident State. This method is 
based on the principle of home market neutrality and does not encourage or 
discourage taxpayers to invest abroad.62 
There are two types of the credit method; full credit and ordinary credit. 
Under full credit, which is not usually applied, all levied source tax is 
credited against the resident tax. Under ordinary credit, the credit is 
restricted, the resident State allows credit for source taxes from its own tax, 
but only up to the extent it is attributable to the source income.63 
2.2.2 The Exemption method 
Using the exemption method, the State of residence excludes foreign 
income taxed in the source State from its tax base. This method reflects 
capital import neutrality (CIN) since all income sourced within a 
jurisdiction shall bear the same level of tax. This method results in the same 
tax burden to foreign taxpayers as to resident taxpayers while they compete 
under the same tax conditions.64  
This method may be used in different ways, either by applying the method 
without loss deduction or by applying the method with temporary loss 
deduction. Applying the method without loss deduction implies that, since 
the PE result is not taken into account in the State of residence, no loss 
utilization will be available. Applying the method with temporary loss 
deduction implies that, the State of residence provides for a loss deduction 
sustained by the PE even if the profits are exempted. However, these losses 
need to be recaptured once the PE returns to profitability (hereinafter 
referred to as exemption with temporary loss-deduction and claw-back).65  
2.2.3 Consequences of the exemption method in a DTC 
When losses incurred by PEs may not be offset against profits in the State of 
residence, where the State applies the exemption without deduction, there is 
                                                
59 OECD (2014) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 
2014, OECD Publishing, 15 July 2014, Article 23 B. 
60 OECD (2014) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 
2014, OECD Publishing, 15 July 2014, Article 23 A. 
61 COM (2006) 824 final, Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, p. 5. 
62 Lang, (n 50), ch. 10, p. 7. 
63 Lang, (n 50), ch. 10, p. 7.  
64 Lang, (n 50), ch. 10, p. 3. 
65 COM (2006) 824 final, Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, p. 5. 
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a difference in treatment in comparison with a purely domestic situation. 
Consequently, the result of the PE in a domestic situation generally forms a 
part of the HO result. However, when it is a border between the PE and the 
HO, and also, an existing DTC applying the exemption method between the 
States, the result of the PE does not form a part of the HO result.66 Hereby, 
the losses of the foreign PE are not being deductible from the profits of the 
HO and the company pays an excessive amount of tax in relation to the total 
net result of its activity while their taxation solely will be based in the result 
achieved in the home State.67 Accordingly, it will be less attractive to 
exercise the freedom of establishment, which may lead to companies 
refraining from setting up PEs in other states. This constitutes an obstacle to 
the freedom of establishment since a company with a PE abroad is in a 
comparable situation to a company with a domestic one.68  
2.2.4 Foreign own losses –different result when applying the 
various methods to avoid juridical double taxation  
The issue arising from the limitation of cross-border loss utilization 
regarding the treatment of a taxpayer’s own losses will be highlighted in an 
example.69 The example will also show that the issue arises from the 
countries’ DTCs, which stipulate the chosen method to avoid juridical 
double taxation. 
Take this example. A company conducts business through its HO and also 
through a foreign PE. Assume that the tax rates are 30 per cent in both 
states, and that the host State’s domestic tax law provide for a loss carry-
forward but is not for a loss carry-back. This example covers a period of two 
years where the HO makes a profit of 100 in both years and the PE makes a 
profit of 100 in year 1 but suffers a loss of 100 in year 2. The methods for 
avoiding juridical double taxation used in this example are the credit 
method, the simple exemption method and the exemption with temporary 
loss-deduction and claw-back.70  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
66 COM (90) 595 final, the proposal for a Council Directive concerning arrangements for 
the taking into account by enterprises of the losses of their permanent establishments and 
subsidiaries situated in other Member States, Explanatory Memorandum, paras. 2-3. 
67 COM (90) 595 final, the Commission’s Proposal for a Council Directive concerning 
arrangements for taking into account by enterprises of the losses of their permanent 
establishments and subsidiaries in other Member States, Explanatory Memorandum, paras. 
2-3. 
68 Case C-141/99 AMID, paras. 25 ff.  
69 Example taken from: Lüdicke and others, (n 9), p. 378. 
70 Lüdicke and others, (n 9), p. 378. 
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 Year 1 Year 2 Total  
P/L PE +100  -100  +/-0  
P/L HO +100  +100  +200  
Exemption, total tax: 90 
Tax 
Tax 
PE 
HO 
 30 
30 
 0 
30 
 30 
30 
30 
60 
Exemption with claw-back, total tax: 60 
Tax 
Tax 
PE 
HO 
 30 
30 
 0 
0 
 30 
30 
30 
30 
Credit, total tax: 60  
Tax 
Tax 
PE 
HO 
 30 
30 
 0 
0 
 30 
30 
30 
30 
Example taken from: Lüdicke and others, (n 9), p. 378. 
 
Firstly, there will be a tax of 30 in the host state in year one and the loss of 
year two cannot be offset against the profit in year one due to the non-
possibility of loss carry-back in the host State. Secondly, regardless of the 
applied method, there will be a tax of 30 in year one in the home State. 
Furthermore, CIN and CEN are of no relevance in this case, since the tax 
rates are the same in both countries.71  
The difference in the application of the methods is revealed in year two. 
Under the credit method and the exemption with claw-back method, the PE 
loss is offset against the profits in the home State and no tax is therefore due 
in the home State. Hereby, the total tax in both countries is 60, which in an 
overall consideration can be seen as appropriate given the total income of 
200. However, this is the case when only looking at year 1 and 2 and 
whether or not the offsetting of the PE loss has a permanent or only 
temporary effect will depend on the future PE results.72  
An issue arises when States use the simple exemption method in their DTC, 
while the PE loss of 100 is disregarded in the home State. In addition the 
HO profit of 100 triggers a tax of 30. Even if the company’s total income in 
both years is 200, as in the other situations, the tax differs while in this case, 
the total amount of tax for the States are 90. This appears in situations where 
the home State applies a territorial system or where the home State applies 
the principle of worldwide income taxation but uses the simple exemption 
method in their DTC.73  
However, if the host State applied a carry-back system the tax of 30 may be 
recovered also when the exemption method was applied. In that case, the 
total tax would be 60 in both the methods, simple exemption and exemption 
with claw-back. Hence, where no carry-back system is at hand, it can be 
discussed whether it is in the responsibility of the home State to balance 
                                                
71 Lüdicke and others, (n 9), p. 378. 
72 Lüdicke and others, (n 9), p. 378. 
73 Lüdicke and others, (n 9), p. 378. 
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such legal inadequacy in the host State. In addition, imputation of ordinary 
losses is primarily a timing issue and thus, it can be argued that such losses 
shall be deductible in the home State and subject to a recapture rule.74 A 
recapture rule permits the deduction of foreign losses at the HO level. 
However, as soon as the PE becomes profitable, the losses are recaptured. If 
there are no profits, there would be no recapture of the losses and the 
deduction of losses would persist in place.75 
2.2.5 The necessity of cross-border loss utilization 
Although companies expect to earn income, losses may occur. Practically all 
tax systems within the EU treat profits and losses asymmetrically. The 
asymmetry occurs where profits are taxed in the year they are earned. 
However, the tax value of the losses is not refundable by the tax 
administration when the losses are incurred. Therefore, it is necessary to set 
off losses against another positive tax base within the company in order to 
avoid ‘over taxation’. That will avoid cash-flow disadvantages, which will 
otherwise result from the time lag between taking the losses into account, 
e.g. by a loss carry-forward rule or a set off against future profits, in 
comparison with an immediate set off against another positive tax base.76  
In addition, the ECJ has already held that cash-flow disadvantages arising 
from situations where there is no immediate relief are enough to conflict 
with EU law.77 Consequently, the ability for Member States to obtain cross-
border loss utilization will thus prevent losses from becoming stranded in 
different entities. Furthermore, a company with a domestic PE will be 
treated as a company with a foreign PE, where they will be automatically 
taxed on the net result whereas both profits and losses will automatically 
and immediately be taken into account. Member States can uphold this only 
with a specific provision.78  
The Commission emphasizes a necessity for effective systems providing for 
cross-border utilization within the EU while it will remove major 
impediments and EU firms will be more competitive on the world market.79 
Yet, the EU’s essential aim conflicts with Member States’ need to maintain 
effective tax systems. The internal market aims to guarantee the exercise of 
the fundamental freedoms,80 without hindrance, for both individuals and 
companies while there is a necessity to maintain Member States’ fiscal 
sovereignty in order to prevent tax base erosion due to misuse or 
unintentional tax exemptions.81 Therefore, the ECJ needs to find a balance 
between those two interests by accepting that some restrictions implemented 
by the Member States are justified. 
                                                
74 Lüdicke and others, (n 9), p. 378. 
75 Lang, (n 21), p. 539.  
76 COM (2006) 824 final, Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, p. 2. 
77 Case C-397/98 Metallgesellschaft paras. 44 and 76.  
78 COM (2006) 824 final, Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, p. 2. 
79 COM (2006) 824 final, Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, p. 10. 
80 TFEU, Articles 21, 34, 45, 56 and 63. 
81 Hilling, Maria, Justifications and Proportionality: An Analysis of the ECJ’s Assessment 
of National Rules for the Prevention of Tax Avoidance, INTERTAX, Volume 41, Issue 5, 
Kluwer Law International, 2013, p. 294.  
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2.3 Plurality of legal sources regarding allocation of taxing 
rights to PEs 
In the treaties within the EU, the division of competences between EU and 
Member States are based on the principle of conferral.82 This principle 
implies that the EU is limited to intervene in areas for which a competence 
has been allocated to the Union by the treaties.83 Additionally, Member 
States remain responsible for all the areas that have not been attributed to 
the Union,84 which implies that Member States retain tax sovereignty apart 
from certain EU directives on the area of direct taxation.85 Tax sovereignty 
refers to both a technical autonomy and an exclusive territorial application. 
The former means the ability to define all aspects within a domestic tax 
system e.g. tax base. The latter means the ability to determine the territorial 
application of the Member States’ tax laws in accordance with the principles 
recognized by international tax law.86 This implies that Member States can 
set up domestic rules or DTCs. Thus, Member States have the possibility to 
tax their residents on their worldwide income and are also free to exempt 
foreign income, which includes foreign losses. However, this applies only to 
the extent that Member States domestic law or DTCs do not conflict with 
EU law.87 In other words, even if Member States remain competent to 
legislate freely in this area, the competence must nonetheless be exercised 
consistently with EU law.88  
Worldwide taxation establishes the risk of international juridical double 
taxation. Yet, the ECJ states that this does not constitute a restriction of the 
freedom of movement within the EU since it is the sequence of two Member 
States parallel exercise of fiscal sovereignty.89 As stated before, since 
juridical double taxation is not contrary to EU law, Member States can 
freely unilaterally or by conventions set the criteria for allocating their 
taxing powers. Regarding conventions, the golden rule implies that States 
conventions are allowed to limit a State’s right to tax; however, they cannot 
extend a State’s right to tax a subject. Otherwise, the aim of limiting 
domestic taxing regimes would not be achieved.90  
Asymmetries will occur due to this system and that the EU does not have a 
requirement regarding consistency. However, some guidelines may be 
recognised. EU law takes precedence over both national and international 
law.91 Member States’ tax rules are subordinated to EU law. Consequently, 
                                                
82 TFEU, Articles 2-6.  
83 TFEU, Article 5.  
84 TFEU, Articles 4-5.  
85 TFEU, Article 4. 
86 Traversa, Edoardo and Pirlot, Alice, Tax Sovereignty and Territoriality under Siege: How 
Far Should the EU Freedoms of Movement Impact on the Territorial Allocation of Taxing 
Powers between Member States?, chapter 6, IBFD, November, 2014, p. 128. (Book: 
Principles of Law: Function, Status and Impact in EU Tax Law, editor Cécile Brokelind). 
87 Marres, (n 3), p. 114. 
88 For example, Case C-26/62 van Gend en Loos, p.12 (B –on the substance of the Case).  
89 Case C-513/04 Kerckhaert-Morres, paras. 20-22; Case C-128/08 Damseaux, paras. 27 
and 35; C-67/08 Margarete Block, para. 31; Case C-96/08 CIBA, para. 28. 
90 Hilling, Maria, Changes in the Application of Tax Treaties in Sweden, INTERTAX, 
Volume 39, Issue 10, Kluwer Law International, 2011, p. 521.  
91 Monsenego, Jérôme Taxation of Foreign Business Income within the European Internal 
Market, Intellecta Infolog, Göteborg, 2011, p. 306. 
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the ECJ respects Member States’ fiscal sovereignty to the extent that they 
do not breach EU law.92 Even if EU law takes precedence over both national 
and international law, the ECJ tends to grant priority to Member States’ 
domestic law and their DTCs by recognising Member States’ restrictive 
measures to be justified.93 The enforcement of the fundamental freedoms is 
crucial for the EU in order to achieve an internal market.94 Problems arise 
since EU law, inter alia the fundamental freedoms, aims to remove the 
borders between Member States while the starting point of international tax 
law is the existence of these borders.95  
3. The territoriality principle 
3.1 Introduction 
Taxation principles have different status and meaning depending on if they 
are statutory or not and also in what legal framework they have their base. 
Principles can be either a descriptive term for a legal consequence or have a 
normative meaning. A descriptive term may not be used as a tool when 
interpreting, while principles having a normative meaning may be helpful 
when solving difficult cases or when interpretation issues arises.96 In order 
for a principle to achieve a normative meaning and be able to serve as an 
interpretation tool, the courts should apply the principle normatively and 
convincing evidence should be at hand that the principle is a proper legal 
policy norm.97  
EU law consists of both written and unwritten law where the unwritten law 
fills the gaps not covered by written law. Some principles within the EU are 
written and stated in the treaty. However, the territoriality principle is 
unwritten law. The unwritten principles work as an interpretation tool of 
existing law and are a necessary tool in order for existing law to be settled in 
the fairest way.98 Therefore, the territoriality principle reflects an elementary 
concept of law that has to be respected when assessing questions concerning 
taxation. Accordingly, an unwritten principle such as the territoriality 
principle is given its effect when the law is applied. Although the 
territoriality principle may be used as an interpretation tool, the ECJ has to 
ensure that the law is observed when interpreting and applying the Treaty. 
Generally, the principles are common to the legal orders of the Member 
States and the Member States may provide the EU with the background 
needed to solve a problem.99 Accordingly, the meaning of unwritten 
principles depends to some extent on how the ECJ uses them.  
                                                
92 C-26/62 van Gend en Loos, p. 12 (B-on the substance of the Case). 
93 For example; C-414/06 Lidl Belgium paras. 23, 37 and 53; C-157/07 Krankenheim paras. 
39 and 43-45. 
94 TEU Article 3 (2) and (3). 
95 Panayi, H.J.I C., Double taxation, tax treaties, treaty-shopping and the European 
Community, Kluwer Law International, 2007, p. 143. 
96 Persson, Östman, Roger, Kontinuitetsprincipen i den svenska inkomstbeskattningen, 
Juristförlaget (Norstedts Juridik AB), upplaga 1:1, Stockholm, 1996, p. 55. 
97 Persson, Östman, (n 96), p. 56. 
98 Borchardt, Klaus-Dieter, The ABC of European Union law, Germany, Publications Office 
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3.2 Definition 
A territorial tax system can be achieved, principally, in two different ways. 
On one hand, it can be achieved by a definition of the tax base for income 
tax purposes, i.e. by limiting the tax base to locally sourced income and 
capital. On the other hand, it can be achieved by exempting foreign-sourced 
income through unilateral, bilateral or multilateral conventions to prevent 
juridical double taxation.100 This has its base in that the States’ right to tax is 
generally based on a factor that has the power to determine connection of 
the income to a certain jurisdiction. Overall, tax systems are usually divided 
into either worldwide taxation systems or territorial taxation systems. The 
difference between the systems is the scope of the States’ taxing powers.  A 
worldwide taxation system taxes its residents on their worldwide income. 
Consequently, in a worldwide taxation system, income that is derived from 
sources both within and outside its territory is subject to taxation. In 
addition non-residents are taxed on the income derived from its territory. In 
contrast, a territorial system commonly taxes both residents and non-
residents solely on the income derived from sources in the State’s own 
territory.101 Having a worldwide taxation for residents implies an unlimited 
tax liability, while having a territorial taxation for non-resident implies 
limited tax liability.102  
The two systems can seem clear, though most of the States do not use one of 
the systems in pure form.103 In addition, the territoriality principle has a 
different meaning whether it is international law or international tax law.  
International law is the set of rules that is usually regarded and accepted as 
binding relations between states and between nations. These rules serve as a 
framework for international relations and are not only considering taxation 
issues, but instead States’ obligations (if expressly consented to a particular 
course of conduct) and relations to other States. The course of conduct in 
terms of treaties generally delegate national jurisdiction to supranational 
tribunals.104 There is no self-standing international tax law, while there is no 
international tax-code, tax-court and no binding international tax law 
provisions. However, for the author, international tax law is the 
determination of tax for a business subject to the tax laws of different 
countries or the international aspects of a State’s tax laws. Consequently, 
international tax law consists of Member States domestic laws, EU law, 
DTCs and also other conventions drawn up by the Member States’ 
regarding their taxing powers.   
Since the territoriality principle has different meanings in international law 
and international tax law, it is of interest to examine the distinction to get an 
overall understanding before the author starts to assess whether the 
territoriality principle can be discerned from ECJ’s case law. In addition, if 
the ECJ discerns a territoriality principle, to be able to discern what concept 
the ECJ adapts.  
                                                
100 Marres, (n 3), p. 114 and 119. 
101 OECD (2013), Adressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, p. 33-34. 
102 Lang, (n 50), ch. 1, p. 1. 
103 OECD (2013), Adressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, p. 33-34. 
104 Slomanson, R, William, Fundamental Perspectives on International law, 6th edition, 
Boston, USA, Wadsworth, 2011, p. 4-5. 
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3.2.1 Territoriality principle as used in international law 
In international law Member States’ sovereignty is recognised. This implies 
that Member States have a supreme authority over a territory, but also 
outside of their territory, over their citizens. In other words, the State has 
jurisdiction based on a territorial connection between the State in question 
and a legal subject or object. Furthermore, Member States sovereignty 
implies sovereignty over a jurisdiction, which includes fiscal jurisdiction. 
Thus, Member States are allowed to tax their citizens and also the income 
connected to their territory. Applying this approach a distinction can be 
made, on one hand personal bases of a jurisdiction and on the other hand 
territorial bases of a jurisdiction. Regarding personal bases, nationality is 
most commonly used. However, domicile can also be used. In the context of 
international law, it is important to consider that taxation of residence is 
regarded as a manifestation of territoriality where a resident is taxed on the 
basis of a stable link with the territory of that State. However, this is in fact 
a worldwide taxation, which is usually the opposite of territorial taxation.105 
Thus, in international law the principle means taxing its residents on a 
worldwide basis and non-residents on a territorial basis. 
3.2.2 Territoriality principle as used international tax law 
In international tax law the territorial basis is of greater importance than the 
personal basis. The territorial base is built upon taxation on basis of 
residence and source. In addition, international tax law usually makes a 
distinction between subjective and objective criteria when allocating tax 
between different jurisdictions. The subjective criteria contain both 
nationality and residence while the objective criteria contains taxation of 
income that has a direct link to a State’s territory. This implies that when a 
tax liability is based on a subjective criterion, the taxpayer is usually, but not 
always, taxed on their worldwide income. If the tax liability, on the other 
hand, is based in an objective criterion, e.g. source taxation, the taxation is 
limited to the income sources within the State’s territory. The principle as 
stated in international tax law is based on the objective criterion, where non-
residents or both residents and non-residents tax liability is limited to the 
income sourced in a State’s territory. Therefore, residents are not normally 
taxed on any foreign-sourced income. This means that territoriality is used 
as an opposition to worldwide taxation,106 where the underlying theory is 
that no taxes can be levied outside the State’s area without violating the 
sovereign tax authority of another state.107 
As mentioned, the meaning of the territoriality principle in international tax 
law is different from its meaning in international law. While international 
law recognises worldwide taxation of its residents as a manifestation of 
territoriality, international tax law recognises territoriality as a tax 
jurisdiction solely on domestic income for both residents and non-residents. 
Thus, the different concepts have the same approach for non-residents; the 
distinction exists in the different treatment of Member States’ residents.  
 
                                                
105 Monsenego, (n 91), p. 59-60. 
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107 Definition of the Territoriality principle, IBFD International Tax Glossary, 2015. 
18 
 
4. ECJ’s case law on cross-border loss utilization 
attributable to PEs and subsidiaries: in relation to the 
territoriality principle 
4.1 Introduction 
While the ECJ to a certain extent seems to offer Member States the 
possibility to apply a territorial approach, it is of interest to review ECJ’s 
case law in order to examine to what extent the territorial approach is 
accepted and if some guidelines can be discerned. 
4.2 Futura 
4.2.1 Facts of the case 
Futura,108 involved a French company that had a PE in Luxemburg. The 
DTC between the two States provided that where an undertaking has a PE in 
both contracting States, each State may tax only the income arising from the 
activity of the PE located on its territory.109  
The total profits of Futura were determined based on accounts kept in 
France in line with French generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAPs). Furthermore, the PE’s income was computed according to an 
apportionment of the total profits of the HO. That method was allowed 
under article 7(4) of the OECD Model Convention until it was deleted in the 
2010 version of the Model.110  
Global losses were incurred during numerous years and the PE paid no taxes 
in Luxemburg. When profits were incurred, the company tried to carry 
previous years losses forward in Luxemburg. However, Luxembourg law 
demanded that certain conditions were fulfilled in order to be able to carry 
forward losses. The right to carry forward losses for non-residents applied if 
the losses were economically related to the income received in Luxembourg 
and if accounting was kept in Luxembourg according to local GAAPs.111 
The economic link condition required that the losses of non-residents had to 
be economically related to income received locally in order for the losses to 
be carried forward in Luxembourg.112  
Since the losses attributed to the PE through an apportionment may have 
been incurred outside Luxemburg and that no proper accounts were kept 
within Luxembourg, the right to carry forward losses was denied.113 The 
issue considered by the Luxembourg tax authorities was that the 
apportionment did not establish a clear link with the domestic income. 
Futura and the PE claimed that such a refusal impaired the freedom of 
establishment guaranteed by the treaty since residents in Luxembourg were 
able to deduct foreign losses.114 The question whether this was in breach of 
                                                
108 C-250/95 Futura Participations SA. 
109 C-250/95 Futura Participations SA, para. 3. 
110 C-250/95 Futura Participations SA, paras. 8-10. 
111 C-250/95 Futura Participations SA, para. 6. 
112 C-250/95 Futura Participations SA, paras. 7 and 9. 
113 C-250/95 Futura Participations SA, paras. 10-11. 
114 C-250/95 Futura Participations SA, para. 12. 
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the freedom of establishment was referred to the ECJ for a preliminary 
ruling. 
4.2.2 The reasoning of the ECJ and the AG Opinion 
Advocate General (AG) Lenz stated that the Luxembourg law requirement 
regarding an economic link was not an issue since it was compatible with 
EU law and also, it complied with the DTC between the countries 
concerned.115  The ECJ meant that ‘such a system, which is in conformity 
with the fiscal principle of territoriality, cannot be regarded as entailing any 
discrimination, overt to covert, prohibited by the treaty’116. This was based 
on that residents were taxed on their worldwide income while non-residents 
were taxed only on its income with source in Luxemburg.117 The ECJ 
admits the territoriality principle as stated in international law. The rules 
were not incompatible with the freedom of establishment and this case states 
that the ECJ admits that the Member State of establishment taxes a PE 
solely on income sourced within its territory.118 Consequently, the Member 
State of establishment must not take into account losses incurred by a PE of 
a non-resident company outside the territory of the Member State of 
establishment unless there is an economic link with the income earned in the 
State of establishment.  
4.2.3 Comments on the case 
The qualification stated by ECJ that the host State can ignore foreign losses 
provided that its resident taxpayers do not receive favourable treatment, i.e. 
where Luxemburg companies being able to use foreign branch loses, implies 
that the territoriality justification is not absolute.119 Even if the ECJ 
considers that territoriality prevents a measure from being restrictive, 
meaning not entailing discrimination, there are no direct tax cases in which 
the ECJ has expressly referred to the territoriality principle as a decisive 
factor that may justify a restrictive tax measure. On this basis, the 
territoriality cannot be said to serve as a justification ground, at least, not 
alone.120 
It is clear from subsequent case law that a system, such as in this case, may 
at least for residents be seen as a discrimination and prohibited by the ECJ. 
Still, this depends on the consequences of such a system. The case is from 
the perspective of the host State, and the ECJ found that the limitation of the 
amount of loss carry-forward available in the State to the losses that had an 
economic link with the income earned there does not entail discrimination 
due to that it is a manifestation of the territoriality principle as stated in 
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international law.121 However, it has to be further examined how the ECJ 
discerns the territoriality principle in a home State perspective. 
4.3 Deutsche Schell 
4.3.1 Facts of the case 
The case concerned a German resident company, Deustche Shell, which 
established a PE in Italy where it inserted a start-up capital. The 
depreciation in value of the start-up capital was not taken into account in 
Italy since the basis for assessment for the taxation of its profits was in 
Italian currency. In later years, Deutsche Shell terminated the PE and 
transferred all its assets to an Italian subsidiary.122  
The amount received from those transactions was paid to Deutsche Shell 
and converted into German currency at the exchange rate applicable on the 
date of receipt. The receiving amount was less than the start-up capital 
inserted in the PE. Deutsche Shell regarded the difference as a currency loss. 
However, the German tax authorities refused to accept the currency loss as a 
real financial loss.123 Thus, the loss was not deductible anywhere; it could 
not be deducted in Italy since the currency loss did not arise there and the 
German tax authorities refused to accept the deduction of the currency loss 
due to the DTC between Germany and Italy, which provided for the 
exemption method.  
The question concerned whether it was contrary to the freedom of 
establishment for Germany to exclude foreign losses, which were incurred 
in a PE in Italy from the corporate tax base. More specific, a currency loss 
suffered upon repatriation of start-up capital granted to its PE in Italy. 
Deutsche Shell argued that the denial of the deduction for currency loss was 
incompatible with the freedom of establishment since the company was 
placed in a less favourable situation than if they had invested the start-up 
capital in company established in Germany.124 Germany, on the other hand 
argued that the system was coherent, while neither currency losses nor gains 
were considered and also, that the allocation of the taxing right through the 
DTC excludes deduction of such losses in the present case.125 
4.3.2 The reasoning of the ECJ 
The ECJ held that the tax system at issue increases the economic risks 
incurred by a company established in a Member State wishing to set up a PE 
in another Member State where the currency used is different from that of 
the state of origin.126  
The arguments raised by Germany were dismissed by the ECJ,127 stating 
that the coherence argument was irrelevant since there is no direct 
relationship between the currency losses and currency gains. By that, the 
                                                
121 COM(2006) 824 final,  Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, p. 4. 
122 C-293/06 Deutsche Shell, paras. 9-11 and 13. 
123 C-293/06 Deutsche Shell, paras. 14-17. 
124 C-293/06 Deutsche Shell, para. 21. 
125 C-293/06 Deutsche Shell, para. 33. 
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failure to take into account a currency loss in order to calculate Deutsche 
Shell’s basis of assessment is not offset by any tax advantage in neither the 
State where it has its HO nor in the State where the PE is situated.128 
Further, Member States competence to decide the direct taxation criteria 
through tax treaties also implies that Member States do not have to deduct 
negative foreign income from a PE solely because they cannot be deducted 
in the State of establishment.  
Consequently, freedom of establishment cannot be understood as meaning 
that Member States are required to draw up tax rules in the basis of another 
Member State in order to ensure that all disparities are removed.129 This 
reasoning by the ECJ is in line with the territoriality principle. However, in 
this case, the tax advantage which relates to a loss, can only be deducted in 
Germany, therefore, it is undesirable to exclude losses from the HO’s tax 
base that never, by nature, can be suffered by the PE.130 
The ECJ stated that the German rules concerning the denial of deduction of 
depreciation in the value of start-up capital were incompatible with EU law 
since the currency loss could not be deducted in either the State of 
residence, Germany, nor in the State of establishment, Italy. Accordingly, 
Germany was required to grant deduction for the foreign exchange loss only 
in so far as its PE does not make any tax-free profits.131  
4.3.3 Comments on the case 
Deutsche Shell did not concern a foreign loss incurred by the PE itself, the 
loss was rather incurred by the HO on the capital inserted in the PE. 
Similarities can be drawn with the concept relating to final losses, namely 
the idea that the losses needs to be taken into account somewhere. Since the 
PE could not suffer the losses in this case, and the losses were not to be 
taken into account at all, the ECJ stated that it was a restriction, which could 
not be justified. Thus, the ECJ maintained an internal market by requiring 
the home State to take the losses into consideration. Yet, Member States’ 
sovereignty, and thereby the underlying territoriality concept, is overlooked 
and disregarded.  
4.4 Lidl Belgium 
4.4.1 Facts of the case 
The case concerned a German company, Lidl Belgium, having a PE located 
in Luxembourg. The HO in Germany was profit making while the PE made 
a loss during the same year. The HO tried to offset the foreign losses in the 
PE against German profits in their income tax return. However, as income 
from the PE in Luxembourg was exempted under the DTC between the 
States, the German authorities argued that losses could not be offset against 
domestic profits. Thus, the German authorities rejected the offset. The 
referred question was whether the non-recognition of the losses in Germany, 
which arose in Luxembourg, was compatible with EU law principles.132 
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Consequently, whether the freedom of establishment precludes a national 
tax regime that does not allow a resident company to deduct losses incurred 
in a PE in another Member State, when the national tax regime does allow 
losses incurred by a resident PE to deduct such losses. 
4.4.1 The reasoning of the ECJ and the AG Opinion 
The possibility for the German company to offset losses in a domestic PE 
constitutes a tax advantage while such an offset is not available when the PE 
is located in another Member State. Hence, the ECJ considered it a 
restriction of the freedom of establishment.133 
The ECJ did not follow AG Sharpston’s reasoning. AG Sharpston found 
that Lidl Beligum had suffered discrimination that was seen as justified but 
not proportionate. The underlying reason for AG Sharpston’s reasoning was 
that Germany had a recapture mechanism. The recapture mechanism 
permitted the deduction of foreign losses at the HO level to be recaptured 
when the PE became profitable. As the recapture mechanism was more 
advantageous than a rejection of deduction of foreign losses, the exemption 
method was going beyond what was necessary in order to attain the 
objectives pursued.134  
The ECJ, however, did not seem to agree that Member States must apply a 
recapture rule. The ECJ considered the restriction to be justified and 
proportionate. It was seen as justified due to the need to preserve a balanced 
allocation of the right to impose taxes and also, the need to prevent the risk 
that losses are used twice. Thus, the ECJ stated that it is not contrary to EU 
law that a Member State prohibits the offsetting of losses of a PE situated in 
another Member State, if the DTC allocates the right of taxation of the PEs 
income to the other Member State and the PE’s losses may be offset in a 
later accounting period, in that Member State.135  
4.4.2 Comments on the case 
The ECJ does hereby allow a territorial approach and Germany has a 
possibility to preserve its tax base, due to the consequences and 
circumstances following the legislation in the Member State where the PE 
was located. It could be of interest how the ECJ would have decided if 
Luxembourg did not provide for carry forward of tax losses. If Luxembourg 
did not provide for such a possibility, Germany might have been forced to 
allow deduction of losses. That argument is in line with the arguments 
raised in Deutsche Shell. Through this reasoning, it is clear that the 
circumstances in each case regarding home State perspective affect the 
ECJ’s judgment. In home State cases, the ECJ seems to accept restrictions 
and thereby a territorial approach where the losses can be taken into account 
somewhere else, i.e. in the State of establishment. Nevertheless, if that is not 
the case, the territorial approach is not justified and has to be considered by 
the State of residence as a “last resort choice”. Consequently, the 
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135 C-414/06 Lidl Belgium, para. 54. 
23 
 
requirement for the home State to deduct foreign losses tends to arise when 
the losses are final or definite.136  
4.5 Krankenheim 
4.5.1 Facts of the case 
Krankenheim concerned a company situated in Germany, having a PE 
located in Austria. According to the applicable DTC, the PE’s income was 
only subject to tax in Austria and tax exempt in Germany.137 Nevertheless, 
Germany did not tax on a strict domestic basis since it allowed deduction of 
foreign PE losses and applied a recapture mechanism to the extent that the 
PE generated profits in the future.138 Stated in other words, the German 
legislation provided for a deduction of foreign losses incurred by a PE, and 
moreover, a taxation of the PE once it became profitable. Thus, Germany 
applied CEN for a loss-making PE during the time the PE was loss making. 
Germany treated domestic and foreign establishments in the same way.  
After the losses of the PE had been completely recaptured, Germany 
replaced CEN with CIN in order for the exemption method to generate its 
full effects. In other words, German rules first allowed deductions of foreign 
losses and later demanded to tax the PE up to the amount of losses 
previously deducted. However, this recapture was not applicable if the PE’s 
losses not generally could be deducted in the source State, namely Austria. 
Further, Austria provided for a loss carry forward, but only to the extent that 
the PE losses in Austria exceeded the positive worldwide income of the 
foreign HO in Germany. This applied irrespective of whether the losses 
were finally deducted in the home State.139 The worldwide taxation of the 
HO exceeded the losses of the Austrian PE, therfore, Austria denied a loss 
carry forward and a loss deduction.140  
4.5.2 The reasoning of the ECJ 
The ECJ stated that the deduction of losses in Germany constituted a tax 
advantage, whereas the following recaptures undid the advantage. Thus, the 
provision provided for an unfavourable treatment of a foreign PE compared 
to a domestic PE.141 
Furthermore, the ECJ was of the opinion that this constituted a restriction of 
the freedom of establishment.142 Hence, it was seen as justified by the need 
to guarantee the coherence of the German tax system and the allocation of 
taxing rights due to the States’ DTC. ECJ found that the recapture was 
applied in a perfectly symmetrical manner and that Germany could not be 
required to take into account the possible negative results arising from the 
allocation of taxing rights to Austria.143 
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4.5.3 Comments on the case 
While the recapture rule applied in a perfectly symmetrical manner, it could 
not constitute a disadvantage but instead, an equal treatment in comparison 
to a domestic PE and thereby did comply with EU law. However, the denial 
of loss carry forward in Austria constituted a disadvantage and did not 
comply with EU law. If it can be assumed that Krankenheim did choose the 
wrong state to claim the rights guaranteed by the fundamental freedoms. It 
can be argued that this case regarding the non-deductibility of remaining 
losses in Austria reconciles with the findings in Lidl Belgium. As recognised 
before, Germany cannot be required to draw tax rules on the basis of Austria 
in order to ensure taxation removing disparities arising from national tax 
rules. Hereby, the ECJ acknowledges Member States’ sovereignty.  
4.6 X AB v Skatteverket 
4.6.1 Facts of the case 
The ECJ recently ruled on another case regarding currency losses,144 and it 
can be discussed whether this judgment overrules the judgment in Deutsche 
Shell.  
The Swedish company X AB established a subsidiary in the United 
Kingdom in 2003. X AB owned 45 per cent of the shares in the subsidiary. 
The shares were issued in USD and were owned by ‘holdings for business 
purposes’ within the meaning of the Swedish law. In the years between 
2003 and 2009, X AB made capital contributions in cash to its subsidiary. 
After this, X AB wished to end the subsidiary’s activities, however, X AB 
was then faced by a risk of currency loss due to the capital contributions 
made to its subsidiary. Consequently, the capital contributions were made at 
an exchange rate more favourable than at the existing time of the transfers.  
The Swedish tax authorities denied X AB the possibility to deduct a 
currency loss resulting from their disposal of ‘holdings for business 
purposes’ in its subsidiary.145  
The Swedish law did not apply different treatment from investments in 
domestic or foreign subsidiaries with respect to capital losses on holdings 
from business purposes. Sweden exempted all profits and all losses for both 
domestic and foreign shareholders. Hence, this is the key difference to 
Deutsche Shell, where it was a difference in treatment between a foreign PE 
compared to a domestic PE.146 
The issue was whether the Swedish legislation denying deductibility of a 
foreign currency loss was compatible with the freedom of establishment 
whereas X AB’s holding represented a definite influence over its 
subsidiaries decisions.147 
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4.6.2 The reasoning of the ECJ and the AG Opinion 
It was held by the ECJ that it did not constitute a restriction due to the fact 
that the legislation applied irrespective of whether the shares were held in a 
company established in another Member State or in Sweden.148  
The ECJ’s decision was in in line with AG Kokott’s opinion. AG Kokott 
concluded that Member States were not required by EU law to provide for a 
deductibility of currency losses, which occurs in connection with shares 
held in a foreign company.149 This means that a Member State of origin 
does not have to adapt its tax system so as to take account of possible 
exchange risks faced by companies since the existence within the EU of 
diverse currencies have no fixed exchange rates. Thus, the Member State of 
origin must not create tax systems dependant on the different tax systems of 
other States.150  
4.6.3 Comments on the case –overruling Deutsche Shell 
It can be argued that the outcome in X AB v Skatteverket can be seen to 
overrule the ECJ’s decision in Deutsche Shell. Stating that, if the decision in 
Deutsche Shell would be based on the decision in X AB v Skatteverket, it 
would not constitute a restriction and even if it would, it would be justified 
by the need to preserve coherence in the tax system. However, the ECJ and 
AG Kokott states that the cases imply different legal contexts arising from 
the application of the Member States’ domestic laws and thereby, also from 
a coherence perspective.151 In other words, in X AB v Skatteverket the 
freedom of establishment does not require a Member State to 
asymmetrically exercise taxation powers as to permit a deduction of losses, 
whereas if the same operations would give a positive result, it would not 
been taxed.152 Nevertheless, such symmetry was not at hand in the Deustche 
Shell,153 where denial of deduction constituted a restriction of the freedom 
of establishment due to the different treatment of domestic and foreign PEs 
and required Germany to grant a deduction for the foreign exchange loss.154 
4.7 Final remarks from the case law examination 
Due to Member States’ competence and fiscal sovereignty, the EU is as 
fragmentized as the many Member States there is and it has to respect each 
and every one of them. This appears to result in a disadvantage regarding 
cross-border loss utilization, while it is, in principle, not possible when the 
States applies a DTC using the exemption method.  
It is not of relevance how Member States achieve a territorial system when 
assessing whether the territorial system is a restriction and whether it could 
be justified. Regarding the question if a restriction may be justified, the ECJ 
has held that, in absence of a DTC, the Member State in which the HO of 
the company is located, to which the PE belongs to, would have the right to 
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tax the profits generated by such an entity. Thus, the objective of preserving 
the allocation of taxing powers between two Member States, which is 
disclosed in the provisions of the convention, is capable of justifying a tax 
regime where it safeguards symmetry between the right to tax profits and 
the right to deduct losses.155  
Consequently, the ECJ has come to the conclusion that the freedom of 
establishment does not preclude a situation in which a company is 
established in a Member State and cannot deduct from its tax base losses 
that relate to a PE in another Member State. However, this applies only to 
the extent, by virtue of a DTC, that the profits arising from the PE are not 
taken into account. In other words, if a State does not have the right to tax a 
PE’s profits, the State would not be obliged to take a PE’s losses into 
consideration.156 This argument is closely linked with the appearance of the 
symmetry argument regarding for example the link between profits and 
losses or tax burden and tax advantage, which has ben evaluated by the ECJ 
in its case law.157 Furthermore, Member States may therefore, tax the 
worldwide income of its residents and allow deductions of foreign losses, or 
to tax only the income sourced in the same Member State as a territorial 
approach and not allow deductions of foreign losses, which are commonly 
used for non-residents.158 
The ECJ’s acceptance regarding disadvantage resulting from no cross-
border loss utilization applies solely to a certain extent. The ECJ still makes 
reservations and holds it possible to interfere in cases where the 
disadvantage would be disproportional. That the ECJ keeps some doors 
open seems necessary, there should always be a ‘last resort choice’ for 
situations where the consequences appears to be disproportionate. It is not 
possible for the ECJ to set out all these exceptions now, and by that, state all 
situations where it is accepted to refuse cross-border loss utilization. Those 
guidelines will have to be drawn up with time, even if it brings uncertainty 
to the taxpayers. Yet, some final remarks regarding the ECJ’s case law shall 
be settled.  
After an analysis of the ECJ case law, a relationship between Member 
States’ sovereignty and the territoriality principle can be acknowledged. 
Mostly considering that the latter is an expression of the geographical limits 
concerning taxing rights derived by the former.159 In line with this 
acknowledgement, the territoriality principle can be highlighted in the 
shadows of Member States’ tax sovereignty. However, even if there are 
facts pointing in that direction, stating that the territoriality principle can be 
discerned within EU law, the author is uncertain. This is due to the fact that 
the principle as such is generally overlooked by the Member States’ tax 
sovereignty as the overall term and also, since it is closely linked with other 
principles within EU, e.g. the principle of symmetry, which seems to be of 
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greater importance in ECJ’s assessments. Hence, it is difficult to give a 
straight answer and to establish whether the ECJ’s case law actually 
expresses a territoriality principle or whether it is an expression for an 
underlying desire for symmetry. However, the author is of the opinion that it 
may not be necessary for the ECJ to prefer one principle rather than another. 
The ECJ has to consider several principles due to different factual 
circumstances in each case; thus, it is an expected consequence that the 
outcomes are different.  
4.8 The differentiation between losses 
In Lidl Belgium and Krankenheim, the ECJ states that when a resident with 
a foreign PE has incurred losses, which cannot be offset against taxable 
income in the State of establishment, the losses can be off set in the State of 
residence. However this applies only in cases where the losses are to be 
considered final based on the factual circumstances.160  
The fact that the ECJ’s statement concerning the territoriality principle 
differs if it is a final loss leads to uncertainty. It could be argued whether the 
ECJ overstretches its judicial power where it forces Member States, in case 
of final losses, to take them into consideration. It is for the ECJ to keep a 
balance between the internal market and Member States’ fiscal sovereignty. 
Member States cannot predict the situations where a territorial approach is 
justified, as it depends on the different circumstances in each case. Yet, 
certain guidelines may clarify some parts of uncertainty.  
Final losses seems to be at hand when there is no further possibilities for a 
loss to be deducted e.g. when the PE is transformed into a corporate entity, 
the PE is transferred to a third party or the PE is shut down definitively. 
When a loss is considered final, a denial of deductibility by the State of 
residence violates the freedom of establishment. Although, it must be 
remembered that this exemption is not allowed in all cases where losses 
become non-usable. It must also be kept in mind that the general principle 
where the exemption method is applicable to the PE due to a DTC is that 
income and losses derived from the PE can only be taken into account 
where the PE is located and thus, under that State’s tax law. This implies 
that, the losses would not be seen as final within the meaning of the courts 
statement if a PE cannot take the losses into consideration due to a 
limitation of loss carry forwards according to the tax law of that State. 
Consequently, such losses cannot be deducted from the State of residence 
tax base.161 Furthermore, it can by this be affirmed that the ‘always-
somewhere approach’, meaning that final losses shall be deductible 
somewhere, is applicable also for PEs.162 
5. Territoriality within EU –concluding remarks 
5.1 Territoriality according to ECJ 
The distinction between ECJ’s understanding and the understanding in 
international tax law is apparent. Exempting residents’ foreign-sourced 
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income would be regarded as a manifestation of territoriality under 
international tax law while that is, as earlier stated, not the ECJ’s 
understanding.163 The principle as it stands in international law is the main 
jurisdiction principle since States have a fundamental right to independently 
rule on their internal standpoint concerning subjects and objects connection 
to their territory. ECJ seems to refer to the principle as is done in 
international law, stating that a State has a right to tax all persons, property 
or activity within its borders. Although, in the context of direct taxation 
within the EU; it should be noted that the precise meaning of the 
territoriality principle is still evolving.164  
The ECJ rules that States exempting residents’ foreign-sourced income shall 
not to be regarded as a manifestation of territoriality.165 For example, in 
Rewe Zentralfinanz, concerning the German legislation, which restricted a 
German resident company to deduct its losses in respect of write-downs to 
the book value of its shareholdings in foreign subsidiaries. The ECJ held 
that the legislation at issue could not be considered as an implementation of 
territoriality principle by meaning that the purpose of the principle is to 
establish the need to take into account the limits of a Member State’s power 
to tax. This assessment had its basis in that it would not result in a 
competing tax jurisdiction becoming involved, while it concerned solely 
German-resident companies being subject to unlimited tax in Germany.166  
According to the ECJ, the territoriality principle’s purpose is to establish the 
necessity to take into account the limits on Member States’ taxing 
powers.167 Thus, the principle implies that non-residents’ income, which is 
not sourced in the State in question, does not need to be taken into 
account.168 This applies even if the worldwide profit was lower.169 The 
ECJ’s interpretation of the territoriality principle implies different treatment 
for residents and non-residents. This difference in treatment may, however, 
be justified while residents and non-residents are not in the same position 
while a Member State usually only has the right to levy tax on non-resident 
to the extent that they earn income in that State.170 Consequently, in relation 
to direct taxes, residents and non-residents are as a rule not comparable.171   
A territorial system as understood by the ECJ, resulting in the impossibility 
of cross-border loss utilization is accepted regarding corporate non-
residents. Yet, a territorial system based on international tax law, which 
makes it impossible for both residents and non-residents to deduct foreign 
losses is not in conformity with EU law since the disallowance for a resident 
may be seen as a restriction of the free movement, especially the freedom of 
                                                
163 Marres, (n 3), p. 114. 
164 Definition of the Territoriality principle, IBFD International Tax Glossary, 2015. 
165 Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-440/08 Gielen, para 58; Case C-470/04 
N, para. 46.  
166 Case C-347/04 Rewe Zentralfinanz para. 69. 
167 Marres, (n 3), p. 123. 
168 Chiara Bardini, The Ability to Pay in the European Market: An Impossible Sudoku for 
the ECJ, INTERTAX 38, no. 1, 2010, p. 20. 
169 Case C-250/95 Futura Participations SA, para. 22.  
170 Marres (n 3), p. 123. 
171 Case C-279/93, Schumacker, para. 31.  
29 
 
establishment.172 An example is where losses incurred by a domestic PE are 
taken into account in calculating the profits and taxable income of the HO, 
while such tax advantage is not granted to a foreign PE. It is a restriction 
due to the discouragement on carrying on its business through a PE located 
in another State.173 In fact, that restriction cannot be justified due to the 
territoriality principle while EU applies another concept of territoriality, 
whether it could be justified on other grounds will not be discussed further.  
5.2 Comparable situations 
The EU shapes its tax policy by the fundamental freedoms guaranteed in the 
TFEU,174 and the ECJ interprets these fundamental freedoms. Hence, the 
ECJ judgments are an important factor for the Member States to consider 
when designing their loss utilization regimes. Consequently, the Member 
States need to consider if their regime results in a prohibited unequal 
treatment, which is considered a restriction on the fundamental freedoms.175 
It has to be a discrimination of the fundamental freedoms in order for the 
ECJ to be able to state that it is a restriction which is not justified, and 
thereby, requires the Member State to take the loss into consideration. The 
following definition of discrimination has been adopted by the ECJ and is 
used when examining comparable situations: 
“Discrimination occurs when equals are treated differently or when 
unequals are treated the same without such treatment having an objective 
justification”.176 
However, the restrictions may be justified under certain circumstances. 
Nevertheless, according to the foregoing, it can be stated that the ECJ’s case 
law on freedom of establishment only provides for a minimum standard 
regarding cross-border loss utilization.177 If the measure is justified and 
proportionate to the attainment of its objective the Member State does not 
need to utilize the foreign losses,178 otherwise, the Member State can be 
required to utilize the losses.179 However, that applies only if the restrictive 
measure depends on that Member State’s law. Therefore, the Member State 
is not required to utilize losses if the restriction depends on disparities from 
other domestic laws.180  
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5.3 Justification grounds closely linked to territoriality 
Since direct taxation falls within the competences of each Member State, 
Member States shall be granted appropriate remedies to uphold their tax 
jurisdictions. Therefore the ECJ has accepted certain possibilities in order 
for Member States restrictive measures to be justified.181 There are several 
similarities between the justification ground of maintaining a balanced 
allocation of taxing rights and other justifications grounds. It can, for 
example, be overlapped by the territoriality principle since it concerns a 
State’s right to tax income from activities in that State.182 In order to get an 
understanding for their systematic structure and the links between the 
balanced allocation of taxing rights and the territoriality principle, it will be 
further examined.  
5.3.1 The territoriality principle as a justification ground 
It can be questioned whether the territoriality principle has been accepted by 
the ECJ as a justification ground. However, the territoriality principle may 
affect the issue whether a Member State’s measure constitutes as a 
restriction or not. The ECJ does not recognise a restrictive measure in cases 
where a Member State only taxes income of a non-resident with a sufficient 
connection to that Member State’s territory.183 In addition, where a State 
allows deduction only in relation to costs that have a purpose of acquiring or 
maintaining income within the State in question.184  
However, in reality, this argument is closely linked with the coherence of a 
Member States’ tax system and also the balanced allocation of taxing rights. 
In the author’s opinion, these two are superior concepts to the territoriality 
principle, since territoriality only has been discussed as a supplement to 
these concepts. Therefore, the principle of territoriality has, in principle, 
only been accepted as a part of the justification when the tax system of the 
Member State in question was based on a coherent application of the 
territoriality principle. This implies situations where the taxpayer is subject 
to tax only in relation to domestic-sourced income in the Member State in 
question. For example, in Futura, where the court concluded that a system 
for taxation of non-resident PE’s income in which only income and 
expenses related to the PE does not constitute a restrictive tax measure.185 
The concept on coherence goes further while it is built on the assumption 
that there is a connection between the benefit arising from a national 
provision and the offsetting of that advantage by a certain tax levy.186 The 
ECJ recognises the concept of coherence, as a direct link that creates 
symmetry in the Member States’ systems of taxation that otherwise would 
have been limited to their territorial limitation of taxing rights. The link is 
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examined in the light of the objective pursued by the Member States’ tax 
rules.187  
A general acceptance of the territoriality principle as a justification ground 
for Member States’ restrictive tax measures would allow Member States to 
treat non-residents and residents in comparable situations differently.188  
This contradicts the concept of an internal market and while it most likely 
results in a restriction of the fundamental freedoms, the ECJ would have to 
balance these interests.  
5.3.2 The need to maintain balanced allocation of taxing rights 
The need to maintain a balanced allocation of taxing rights has played a 
vital role as a justification ground in the ECJ’s assessments regarding the 
limitation of cross-border loss utilization.189 The central idea of this 
justification is that Member States have the right to ensure that incomes 
subject to the balanced allocation of taxing rights in a State actually can be 
taxed there. It has in some cases been accepted as a sole ground, but also in 
conjunction with Member States goal of preventing tax avoidance.190 Stated 
in other words, these justification grounds have their bases in Member 
States’ work to preventing the erosion of tax bases from one State to 
another.  
In later years the ECJ has tended to show an altered attitude against 
Members States’ attempts to justify their tax systems. Consequently, 
Member States’ attempts to make their restrictive rules justified have 
successfully increased.191 This evolution by the ECJ is of interest since this 
justification ground has a close connection with the territorial approach as 
such. The balanced allocation of taxing rights can be invoked when a 
Member State has a reasonable tie to the tax subject, the tax object or both. 
Therefore, if the legislation at issue is proportionate, Member States have a 
possibility to invoke the rules and prevent transfer of tax bases outside their 
tax jurisdiction.192 This indication can be seen as to have a close connection 
with the territoriality principle, while a territorial approach constitutes a 
right for a State to tax income linked to that particular State. However, the 
difference between the balanced allocation of taxing right and the 
territoriality principle is that the link regarding the balanced allocation of 
taxing rights does not have to be territorial but may instead be tied to the 
State on other criteria.  
The ECJ has elaborated a comprehensive case law regarding this 
justification ground. Hence, there are some unresolved issues, which have 
not been answered by the current assessments. It is obvious that the 
justification ground’s main goal is to prevent the transfer of tax bases 
between States, which also is the basis for Member States territorial 
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approach regarding taxation. At the same time, Member States have a 
protection-worthy right to tax activities conducted on its territory. There is 
no conflict when the income has been earned in the State of residence, 
because in that situation, the State of residence and State of establishment 
are the same. However, the issue appears when those two statements by the 
ECJ point in different directions.193  
Further, it seems that the traditional international tax interpretation of 
balanced allocation of tax jurisdictions, where a tax jurisdiction is based on 
a distinction between residents and non-residents taxpayers regarding the 
right to levy taxes between different jurisdictions cannot be transposed fully 
to the area of EU direct taxation.194 This reasoning is in line with the early 
judgement in Avoir Fiscal, where the ECJ rejected different treatment of 
residents and non-residents.195 This reasoning does not imply that Member 
States way of allocating taxes based on the distinction between residents and 
non-residents never applies with EU law.196 Firstly, the ECJ has stated that 
Member States retain the competence to define their own scope of taxation 
and therefore the relevant factors for establishing tax liability.197 Secondly, 
the fact that the ECJ even considers the concept of ‘balanced allocation’ in 
its case law implies that the ECJ is willing to accept an allocation of tax 
jurisdiction based on the traditional international tax interpretation. 
However, only to the extent that it does not result in different treatment of 
taxpayers in otherwise comparable situations.198 
It can be questioned what distribution of taxing rights the EU wants to 
ensure. In line with the above reasoning, it is clear that EU law does not 
provide any concrete guidance on the allocation of income between Member 
States. The case law shows that the ECJ is prepared to decide in line with 
international principles concerning direct tax cases, essentially regarding 
allocation of income between Member States.199 Consequently, the EU must 
consider the principles that form the basis for the OECD model tax 
convention as expressions of the balanced allocation of taxing rights. This 
conclusion has support in the ECJ’s assessment, for example, SGI,200 where 
it is stated that it is worth protecting a Member State’s right to tax income 
from business conducted in the Member State. The reasoning is in line with 
article 7 of the OECD model treaty, stating that where a PE is deemed to 
exist, the source State is entitled to tax the income allocated to the PE. 
Additionally it has also its basis in another statement by the ECJ where the 
ECJ states that it is not unreasonable for Member States when allocating 
their powers of taxation to find inspiration from international practice, 
namely the OECD.201 
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5.4 Final remarks 
It is reasonable that Member States by accepting these justification grounds 
are entitled to prevent taxpayers from freely choosing the State in which 
their income is taxed. The author finds it reasonable mostly because the 
EU’s internal market includes no common rules for the calculation of 
income and no common tax rates. Consequently, no common consolidated 
corporate tax base currently exists even if it has been up for discussion 
several times.202 Member States still have the responsibility to maintain 
effective tax systems in order to sustain their welfare systems. However, the 
author would prefer more precise guidelines that are clearer regarding in 
what situations the justification grounds are applicable to and at the same 
time, when they are proportionate. If so, it would increase the foreseeability 
for the Member States when creating restrictive measures to prevent erosion 
of their tax bases and to apply a territorial taxation.  
Due to Member States’ fiscal sovereignty, juridical double taxation and 
denied cross-border loss utilization are potential issues. While juridical 
double taxation is not considered a restriction of the freedom of 
movement,203 it could be argued whether a restriction should be at hand 
where cross-border loss utilization is denied. Accordingly, Member States 
do generally not have the possibility to tax foreign income due to their fiscal 
sovereignty. If that is the case, then foreign losses should also not been 
taken into account. This reasoning is based on that it would be inadequate if 
Member States on one hand, tax their residents on their worldwide income 
and the ECJ does not require Member States to prevent juridical double 
taxation, and on the other hand chooses to exempt foreign income but still 
have to set off foreign losses. In the author’s opinion, a balanced allocation 
of the taxing power is connected to that the profits and losses shall both be 
taken into account in order to uphold symmetry. Where Member States use 
the exemption method, there is no such symmetry since the income is 
exempted. Inherently, it appears reasonable that the losses are not taken into 
account when the profits are exempted.  
6. Conclusion and future aspects  
From an overall perspective regarding the topic of cross-border loss 
utilization concerning the treatment of the taxpayer’s own losses in a PE, 
there is a gap between the concerns expressed by the business community 
and the large evolution of international rules. This gap may increase due to 
that the OECD BEPS project can affect the international rules by enabling 
Member States to preserve their tax bases. The co-ordination of tax rules 
between States is desirable since many mismatches arise from States 
different tax laws; however, it is a far-reaching problem not solved 
overnight. The EU’s attempts to co-ordinate and harmonize the area of 
direct taxation has led to great developments. However, it is necessary to 
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have a balance between on one hand, the effectiveness of rules and on the 
other hand, their fairness and appropriateness.  
 
Overall, businesses are affected where a State of residence uses a territorial 
system or where the State of residence applies the principle of worldwide 
income taxation and uses the simple exemption method in its DTC. Mostly 
due to that foreign losses are lost or cannot be offset in either the host State 
or the home State. Thus, legislators shall take the business perspective into 
account in future legislative processes, while, in the author’s opinion, 
companies’ business decision shall not be influenced by tax considerations 
and if offsetting of losses is possible. Consequently, companies shall not 
refrain from establishing a PE in another State. 
 
The aim of this thesis was to examine whether a territoriality principle can 
be discerned regarding the tax treatment of loss utilization in cross-border 
situations attributable to PEs. In the author’s view, with respect to the 
examination, the ECJ has not been expressing a clear meaning of the 
territoriality principle and has not been using it as a sole justification 
ground. The author is of the opinion that concept of territoriality is an 
underlying part of Member States’ sovereignty, which the ECJ wants to 
respect due to the area of direct taxation to a large extent, still remain in the 
Member States’ competence.  
As the Member States want to preserve their tax base, the territorial 
approach becomes a consequence of Member States’ sovereignty rather than 
self-supporting principle of its own. However, the concept of territoriality is 
still evolving within EU and hopefully the BEPS project will highlight the 
necessity of a territoriality concept. The concept may solve issues related to 
foreseeability, tax avoidance and for Member States to be able to protect 
their tax bases. The issue seems to continuously return to the overall 
problem arising from deficient guidelines. Member States needs guidance 
and it ought to be achieved if the ECJ can find a balance between on the one 
hand, the concept of an internal market and on the other hand, Member 
States' sovereignty. As the current law stands, Member States sovereignty is 
acknowledged, which leads to that cross-border losses attributable to PEs 
are being stranded where a DTC applying the exemption method exists.  
However, it remains difficult to accept a territorial approach within EU due 
to several reasons. Firstly, the concept of territoriality is not clear. Secondly, 
Member States within EU have an inconsistent and diverse perception of 
territoriality. Thirdly, the role by territoriality to be assumed from an EU 
law justification point of view is controversial, since it is difficult to predict 
the evolution of territoriality and its proper understanding as a justification 
ground. This depends predominantly on its close connection to balanced 
allocation of taxing powers and thereby also, symmetry. Fourthly, because 
worldwide taxation has been recognised to be in conformity with EU law.204 
As regards the subsequent aim, which can be answered even though the ECJ 
case law did not recognise a self-supporting territoriality principle, the 
ECJ’s understanding of territoriality reconciles with the concept in 
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international law. This is because the ECJ has stipulated that a Member 
State acts in accordance with the territoriality principle if it taxes resident 
taxpayers on their worldwide income and non-resident taxpayers on their 
income sourced in the State in question. 
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